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INVESTORS BEWARE: HOW CALIFORNIA
MUNICIPALITIES GET AWAY WITH
DEFRAUDING INVESTORS AFTER NUVEEN
MUNICIPAL HIGH INCOME OPPORTUNITY
FUND V. CITY OF ALAMEDA
Allan Gustin
I. INTRODUCTION
The first blue-sky laws were enacted in 1911 in the state of
Kansas.1 Explanations vary as to how the laws earned their “bluesky” name.2 Some suggest that the purpose behind these statutes was
to address such “speculative schemes which [had] no more basis than
so many feet of blue sky.”3 Others suggest that the Kansas legislature
created these laws in fear of “fast-talking eastern industrialists selling
everything including the blue sky.”4 One way or another, the name
stuck, and by 1933 at least forty-eight jurisdictions had enacted bluesky statutes.5
In 1917, California enacted its first blue-sky laws, and except for
minor modifications, these laws remained the basis of its securities
regulation until 1968.6 In 1968, California consolidated its blue-sky

 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Classical Studies,
Brigham Young University, 2012. Special thanks to Professor Michael Guttentag for his time,
attention, and legal advice. Thanks to Cameron Bell, Leah Johannesson, Lauren Gerenraich,
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1. LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 53 (4th ed. 2006).
2. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 8.1, at
490–92 (3d ed. 1995).
3. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
4. HAZEN, supra note 2, at 491–92.
5. LOSS, supra note 1, at 58.
6. 9 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 401 (10th ed. 2012).
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laws when it passed the California Corporate Securities Act of 1968.7
Among the Corporate Securities Act’s provisions was a prohibition
against misrepresentations made in the course of buying or selling
securities.8 While the exact scope of the term “securities” is still
debated, it is clear that municipal bonds fall within its meaning.9
Municipal bonds are debt securities issued by states, cities, counties,
and other government entities to finance capital projects including
building schools, highways, and sewer systems.10
To encourage investing in municipal bonds, municipalities give
investors several benefits in return for their investment.11 Most
municipal bond interest payments are exempt from federal income
tax.12 These bonds may also be exempt from state and local taxes on
residents in the state where the bond is issued.13 As a result of these
tax benefits, interest on municipal bonds is usually lower than on
taxable fixed-income securities.14
While several types of municipal bonds are available for
investment, the two most common types of municipal bonds are
general obligation bonds and revenue bonds.15 Generally, debt
service is a relatively small portion of most governments’ budgets.16
However, a state’s reliance on deficit financing can lead to lower
credit ratings, which is the case for states such as California, Illinois,
and Arizona.17
In September 2013, the Ninth Circuit explored the intersection
between the California Corporate Securities Act of 1968 and the
Government Tort Claims Act—that is, the act that grants
municipalities sovereign immunity from lawsuits.18 Section 25400 of
the Corporate Securities Act, together with section 25013, held
municipalities liable for misrepresentations made in the sale of a
7. Id.
8. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400 (West 2014).
9. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West 2001).
10. Rabah Arezki et al., Municipal Fallout, 48 FIN. & DEV. 34, 35 (2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/arezki.htm.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 730 F.3d 1111
(9th Cir. 2013).
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security, but section 818.2 granted immunity to public entities for the
misrepresentations of their employees.19 Nuveen Municipal High
Income Opportunity Fund, Nuveen High Yield Municipal Bond
Fund, and Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (collectively,
“Nuveen”) sued the City of Alameda and Alameda Power and
Telecom (APT) for alleged misrepresentations made in association
with the sale of municipal bonds.20 The Court held that absent a clear
indication of a legislative intent to remove municipal liability no
cause of action for securities fraud could be upheld.21 The Court
found that no such indication existed in the California Corporate
Securities Act and granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants.22
This Comment explores the potential effects of the Ninth Circuit
finding that California municipalities are immune from state causes
of action for securities fraud. Part II describes the factual background
of Nuveen Municipal High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of
Alameda.23 Part III sets forth the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. Part IV
examines the value of a state cause of action for securities fraud, the
financial repercussions of the court’s decision, and the steps that the
California legislature and California Supreme Court can take to
counteract the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Part V concludes that
California’s economy only stands to suffer from the Ninth Circuit’s
holding, and that the California legislature or California Supreme
Court should rectify the Ninth Circuit’s holding.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the late 1990s, the City of Alameda (“Alameda”) decided to
include telecommunications––cable TV and Internet––as part of its
municipal electrical system.24 APT sought to borrow a significant
portion of the capital needed to fund this project, so it issued revenue
bond anticipation notes in the amount of $33 million.25
Relying on the official statement prepared by a municipal bond
underwriter, Stone & Youngberg, and a feasibility report on the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 25013 (West 2014); id. § 25400; id. § 818.2.
Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1115.
Id. at 1126–27.
Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1116–18.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
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proposed refinancing prepared by Uptown Services, Nuveen
purchased $17.75 million in face value of the notes.26 Nuveen later
purchased an additional $2.8 million for a total face value of $20.55
million.27
The official statement disclosed certain risk factors affecting the
viability of the system.28 Among those factors disclosed was the risk
of competition from other service providers, including Comcast.29
While the official statement suggested that the telecommunications
system could be a strong competitor in the field, it specifically stated
that no assurances could be made in the notes or in any future
financing that APT may need to repay the notes.30
The feasibility report, included as part of the official statement,
relied on information provided by APT, which included a five-year
financial forecast and subscriber and financial growth projections.31
To compensate for the risks assumed, the notes offered an
interest rate of 7 percent, with a yield to maturity at 7.25 percent,
nearly double that of a typical tax-free municipal bond in 2004.32
Three sources secured repayment of the notes on June 1, 2009,
including: (1) net revenue from the telecom system; (2) a potential
refinancing of the system prior to maturity; and (3) proceeds from
the sale of the system.33
Due to fierce competition with Comcast and the sharp economic
downturn in 2007 and 2008, APT could not repay the notes from the
system’s revenue, and refinancing was no longer an option.34 In
November 2008, Alameda decided to sell the system to Comcast for
$15 million.35 Although Nuveen received more than $6 million in
interest payments on the notes, it sustained losses of more than $10
million on the notes.36
Attempting to rectify its losses, Nuveen sued the City of
Alameda “for alleged violations of Section 10b-5 and Section 20(a)
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1115, 1117.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1116–17.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and California Corporate
Securities Act [sections] 24000, 25500, and 25504.1.”37 “Nuveen
argue[s] that the official statement contained inflated and unrealistic
projections that materially overstated the telecom system’s
anticipated performance.”38 Nuveen alleged that Alameda’s
misrepresentations fraudulently induced Nuveen to purchase the
notes.39
Nuveen introduced expert testimony that the projections of the
official statement relied on outdated information.40 Nuveen’s expert
further testified that the outdated information “artificially increased
the expected [average revenue per unit] and number of subscribers in
the subsequent five years.”41 Nuveen’s expert also explained “that
ten days before the issuance of the official statement, the Alameda
Public Utilities Board adopted a five-year business plan for Alameda
Power that used significantly less optimistic projections for Alameda
Power Cable’s future financial performance than the projections in
the Official Statement.”42
Alameda eventually moved for summary judgment on both the
federal and state claims.43 The district court granted Alameda’s
motion and held that Nuveen could not establish a triable issue as to
loss causation on the federal claims, and that Alameda was immune
from suit under California law on the state law claims.44 Nuveen
appealed summary judgment.45
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision in its
entirety.46 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit rejected Nuveen’s
contention that loss causation could be shown by demonstrating that
they would not have purchased the notes “but for” Alameda’s
fraudulent misrepresentations.47 The court followed the United States
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1118–20.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1121.
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo48 that loss causation and transactional causation are two
separate requirements.49 Transactional causation is satisfied by
showing that the injury would not have occurred but for the
defendant’s misrepresentations.50 Loss causation, on the other hand,
requires that there be a causal link between the plaintiff’s injuries
and the misrepresentation.51 The misrepresentation must be the
cause-in-fact of the injuries alleged by the plaintiff.52 The court
concluded that Nuveen had in fact failed to establish a triable issue of
fact as to loss causation.53
The court then turned to Nuveen’s state law claims for violations
of the California Corporate Securities Act.54 The court recognized
that the Corporate Securities Act imposes liability on “‘any person’
who willfully makes a false or misleading material statement for the
purpose of inducing the sale of a security.”55 “The [Act] defines
‘person’ to include ‘a government, or a political subdivision of a
government.’”56 However, the California Tort Claims Act of 1963,
currently known as the Government Claims Act, provides immunity
to public entities “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.”57
Section 818.8 specifically provides immunity where an injury is
caused by a negligent or intentional misrepresentation of an
employee of a public entity.58
Despite Nuveen’s arguments to the contrary, the court
concluded that Alameda was in fact immune from suit for violations
of the Corporate Securities Act.59 In doing so, the court drew upon
the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Caldwell v. Montoya.60
In Caldwell, the court considered whether public employees
were liable for discretionary acts that allegedly violated the state’s

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

544 U.S. 336 (2005).
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1124.
Id. (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25400, 25500 (West 1969)).
Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 25013 (West 1994)).
Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815 (West 1963)).
Id.
Id. at 1127.
897 P.2d 1320 (Cal. 1995); Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1125.
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Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).61 The court ultimately
concluded that the general duty imposed on public employees under
the FEHA did not override immunity for discretionary acts provided
by section 820.2 of the California Government Code.62 The
California Supreme Court opined, “The intent of the [Government
Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against
government entities [or employees], but to confine potential
governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity
is waived only if the various requirements of the [A]ct are
satisfied.”63
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court held that statutory
immunity could only be withheld where there exists a clear
indication of legislative intent that such immunity be withheld or
withdrawn.64 In other words, the statute must clearly withdraw
statutory immunity.65
The Ninth Circuit went on to reject Nuveen’s contention that
DeJung v. Superior Court66 governed this dispute, reasoning that the
employer had no basis for invoking immunity.67 The Court
ultimately concluded that because the California Corporate Securities
Act did not override the Government Claims Act, Alameda properly
invoked immunity against Nuveen’s claims.68 The district court
properly granted summary judgment on the Nuveen’s state-law
claims.69
IV. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s holding may trouble California municipal
bond investors. After Nuveen, municipalities can, in essence, defraud
investors. California law leaves those investors without a state-law
remedy.
However, investors may not be the only ones affected by the
court’s ruling. Investors’ reactions to the Ninth Circuit’s holding may

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1322.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1328 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1331.
Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1125.
87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 99 (Ct. App. 2008).
Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1127.
Id.
Id.
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create problems for municipalities seeking to borrow funds for public
infrastructure projects—that is, schools, highways, or public
facilities.70 With California as the largest municipal borrower in the
United States,71 the federal and other state governments may
experience financial shocks flowing from the Court’s decision.
Despite these disconcerting effects, the California legislature or
the California Supreme Court can restore the state-law remedy
eradicated by the Ninth Circuit’s holding. This part explores the
effects likely to flow from the court’s decision and why California
should take prompt action to return to investors a state-law remedy
for municipalities’ misrepresentations.
A. State v. Federal Securities Laws:
Does the Court’s Ruling Make a Difference?
To establish a claim for securities fraud under federal law, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission;
(2) scienter; (3) connection with the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) reliance, often referred to as transaction causation; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation.72
Similarly, section 25400 of the California Corporations Code
states:
It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in this
state . . . to make, for the purpose of inducing the purchase
or sale of such security by others, any statement which
was . . . false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or which omitted to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading, and
which he knew or had reasonable ground to believe was so
false or misleading.73
Under California law, plaintiffs have a lesser burden to satisfy in
establishing a cause of action for misrepresentations.74 Section 25400
does not require (1) proof of reliance, or (2) proof of causation,
although the facts must be material.75
70. Randle B. Pollard, Who’s Going to Pick Up the Trash?—Using the Build America Bond
Program to Help State and Local Governments’ Cash Deficit, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 171, 180 (2011).
71. Arezki et al., supra note 10, at 35–36.
72. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
73. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400 (West 2014).
74. WITKIN, supra note 6, § 444.
75. Id.
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In Nuveen, this lesser burden would likely have led to a different
outcome with regard to Nuveen’s state cause of action. The Ninth
Circuit granted Alameda’s motion for summary judgment because
Nuveen had failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to loss
causation.76 Because causation does not need to be proven under the
California Corporate Securities Act, Nuveen would have been able to
survive summary judgment.77 As a general matter, the California
Corporate Securities Act provides relief where the federal securities
laws do not.
B. Financial Repercussions
As of 2012, California has the tenth largest economy in the
world with a Gross State Product of more than $2 trillion.78 Of that
total amount, California collected through taxes during the 2012–13
tax year around $100 billion.79 However, California currently carries
more than $800 billion in financial obligations.80 Even though
California’s financial state has recently improved somewhat, it still
maintains the third-lowest credit rating after Illinois and New
Jersey.81
Eradicating municipal liability for misrepresentations in the
securities arena may only exacerbate California’s already heavy debt
problems. As the largest borrower among all fifty states, California
relies heavily on bonds to meet its financial obligations.82 As a
general matter, investors will not assume risks without some promise
of a higher return. As the old adage goes: high risk, high return.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Nuveen arguably creates higher
risk for bond-purchasing investors. They must run the risk that
municipalities will either intentionally or negligently misrepresent an
76. Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 730 F.3d 1111, 1123
(9th Cir. 2013).
77. WITKIN, supra note 6, § 444.
78. Adam Belz, Map: GDP of US States Compared to Other Countries, STAR TRIB.
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.startribune.com/blogs/244326311.html.
79. Sources of State Taxes, CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, http://www.sco.ca.gov
/state_finances_101_state_taxes.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
80. William Fletcher & Ed Ring, Calculating California’s Total State and Local
Government Debt, CAL. POLICY CTR. (April 26, 2013), http://californiapublicpolicycenter.org
/calculating-californias-total-state-and-local-government-debt/.
81. James Nash & Brian Chappatta, California Upgraded by Moody’s to Highest in 13
Years, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-25/moody-s
-upgrades-california-to-aa3-on-financial-gains.html.
82. Id. at 36.
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investment to the investor’s detriment. Thus, it follows that to
convince these investors to lend money, California municipalities
will have to offer higher interest rates. If the risk is too great,
investors may take “flight to quality” bonds from other
municipalities.83 With California being the largest municipal
borrower, this can have “spillover effects,” not only on neighboring
states but also on the federal government as a whole.84
1. Flight to Quality and Spillover Effects
A recent study explored “whether a shock to the market for
bonds of one U.S. state can affect the markets for bonds from other
states (a situation known as ‘spillover’).”85 The study also
investigated the effects that state bond markets might have on the
market for U.S. Treasury securities.86 As a general matter, when a
state bond market suffered as borrowing costs increased, investors
fled to higher quality, less risky bonds in neighboring states.87
Of the few states that could potentially affect federal securities,
California falls within that small group.88 Yields on California bonds
and those on federal securities move “significantly in opposite
directions following a shock to both bond markets.”89 Thus, a shock
to the California bond market may lead to increased instability in the
Treasury bond market.90
2. Increased Interest Rates
The bonds purchased by Nuveen yielded interest rates more than
double those of a typical bond.91 During the life of those bonds,
Nuveen was able to recover more than $6 million.92 Despite this
generous rate to reflect the risky nature of the bonds, Nuveen still
lost millions of dollars.93 The Ninth Circuit’s holding makes these

83. Id. at 35.
84. Id. at 36.
85. Id. at 35.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 730 F.3d 1111, 1116
(9th Cir. 2013).
92. Id. at 1117.
93. Id.
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bonds even riskier. Investors have no way of knowing whether the
information they are using in buying municipal bonds is reliable. To
compensate for this new risk, investors will need to demand a higher
rate of interest.94 This in turn increases the borrowing costs of
municipalities, triggering the spillover effects and the flight to
quality discussed in the previous section.95 Simply, California cannot
afford such a result.
C. Resolving the Issue
To resolve the issue created by Nuveen, a solution will need to
come from either the California legislature or the California Supreme
Court. The Ninth Circuit explained in its decision what the California
Securities Act lacked: clear intent to withdraw immunity.96
1. Legislative Relief
At this point, it is not enough for a statute to merely state that a
municipality may be liable.97 The California Corporation Act did that
already.98 The California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Caldwell is
instructive as to why clear withdrawal of immunity is necessary. In
interpreting the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute,”
the Caldwell court reasoned, “The intent of the [Act] is not to expand
the rights of plaintiffs in suits against government entities [or
employees], but to confine potential government liability to rigidly
delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various
requirements of the [Act] are satisfied.”99 The California Supreme
Court went on to explain that:
When addressing the Act’s application, we have
consistently regarded actionable duty and statutory
immunity as separate issues, holding that in general, an
immunity provision need not even be considered until it is
determined that a cause of action would otherwise lie
against the public employee or entity. This analytical
treatment arises from our recognition that the question of
94. Pollard, supra note 70, at 193.
95. Id.
96. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1126.
97. Id.
98. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400 (West 2014); id. § 25013.
99. Caldwell v. Montoya, 897 P.2d 1320, 1328 (Cal. 1995) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[actionable] duty is only a threshold issue, beyond which
remain the immunity barriers.100
The Ninth Circuit understood this to mean that a statute cannot
merely impose liability, for that would only satisfy the question
of actionable duty.101 Rather, a statute must also expressly
withdraw immunity to clear the “immunity barriers.”102
Therefore, to properly amend the California Securities Act, the
California legislature must understand that clearly stating
liability is insufficient; rather, an amendment to the act must
expressly withhold immunity.103
2. Legislative or Judicial Relief
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme
Court identified another avenue by which the California legislature
might clearly indicate an intent to remove statutory immunity: where
the statute’s purpose is clearly intended to address an issue specific
to the government.104 The Caldwell court turned to whistle-blower
statutes as a quintessential example of such statutes.105
In a lengthy footnote, the California Supreme Court noted a
court of appeal decision, Southern California Rapid Transit District
v. Superior Court.106 There, the court of appeal determined that a suit
for wrongful discharge under a whistle-blower statute could not be
defended on grounds of governmental immunity.107 In light of this
case, the Caldwell court concluded:
Insofar as such whistleblower statutes focus in particular on
those who act to suppress or punish revelations of fraud,
corruption, or illegality in government business, the core
statutory objectives might well be obviated by a conclusion
that cover-up efforts by a public official are eligible for
immunity. By their specific nature and purpose, such laws
may indeed provide a clear indication of intent that the

100. Id. at 1328–29 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
101. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1126.
102. Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1329.
103. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1126.
104. Id.
105. Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1329–30 n.7.
106. Id.; 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665 (Ct. App. 1994).
107. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665, 676 (1994).
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personal immunities of public employees are abrogated.108
Under this rationale, the Ninth Circuit might have withheld
immunity from Alameda on policy grounds where the core statutory
objective might be obviated by making municipalities eligible for
immunity. The purpose in enacting the California Securities Act was
“to protect the public against the imposition of unsubstantial,
unlawful and fraudulent stock and investment schemes and the
securities based thereon.”109 Thus, the California legislature can
either clarify the purpose of the California Securities Act, or the
California Supreme Court can review this issue and conclude on
policy grounds that municipalities frustrate “core statutory
objectives” when they claim immunity from securities fraud liability.
In sum, the potential effects of the Ninth Circuit’s holding may
be avoided by the California legislature amending the securities laws
to reflect a clear indication of withdrawing statutory immunity.
Moreover, either the California Supreme Court can hold on policy
grounds that the Ninth Circuit’s holding would frustrate the core
statutory objectives of the California Securities Laws, or the
California legislature can provide a clear indication through the
statutory purpose. Without the intervention of these two branches of
government, investors will be at a loss for a state cause of action and
will be forced to turn to the federal securities laws for redress.
V. CONCLUSION
As California faces troubling times ahead, increased borrowing
costs will only exacerbate the state’s growing financial problems.
The California state cause of action against misrepresentation plays a
unique role independent from the federal securities law against
securities fraud. Unless the California legislature or California
Supreme Court clarify the intent of the Corporate Securities Act, the
potential effects may harm not only the fragile economic
circumstances in California, but may spillover and affect the United
States as a whole. For the policy reasons discussed in this Comment,
immunity from liability in the securities context will only harm
California municipalities and the people they represent.

108. Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1330 n.7.
109. People v. Syde, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (Cal. 1951).
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